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. Siantar, located in the region. He also serves as chairman of the DPRD-GR, which is authorized to pass legislation concerning the "household affairs" of the regency, and of the Front Nasional (National Front), a representative body charged with providing "social support" for and "social control" of the policies of the government. The seventeen sub-districts (ketjamatan) in Simalungun are headed by administrative of ficials of the territorial bureaucracy who are appointed by the Regional Head. The lowest unit of government is the village or village complex (kepenghuluan), of which there are 530 in Simalungun. Each kepenghuluan is headed by an (in theory) popularly elected penghulu, who is responsible for the settlement of disputes within the village and serves both as the local agent of the central government and the spokesman for his people to the sub-district officer.
The regency of Simalungun is a multi-ethnic, econom ically diverse region which has been subject to a great deal of social change in recent history. Toward the end of the nineteenth century Simalungun consisted of a number of traditional kingdoms (keradjaan)* and was peopled by perhaps 75,000 Simalungun or Eastern Batak, so called to distinguish them from the North Tapanuli Batak of Lake Toba and the Silindung Valley, the South Tapanuli Batak of Mandailing, Angkola and Sipirok, and the Karo Batak to the north; these groups speak generally mutually unintelligible languages.
The multi-ethnic characteristics of present-day Simalungun are in large part a result of the Liberal Policy of the colonial period, which encouraged private investment in Indonesia and led to the large-scale growth of Europeanowned rubber, tea, tobacco and palm-oil plantations in the east coast lowlands of Sumatra, including part of Simalungun (now consisting of the six subdistricts collectively called Lower Simalungun). Javanese were imported to work on the plantations and, in Lower Simalungun, soon outnumbered the indigenous people. North Tapanuli Batak, skilled in the techniques of wet rice agriculture, were encouraged by the Dutch to move into Simalungun to provide food for the plan tation workers. Many of them had received a rudimentary education in Christian missionary schools and secured em ployment as plantation and government clerks. As the North Tapanuli Batak came in and settled the best rice land, the less aggressive Simalungun people moved up into the less fertile foothills of the Bukit Barisan mountain range, an area which now comprises seven subdistricts and is called Upper Simalungun. During this period Pematangsiantar grew from a small village and seat of one of the traditional kingdoms into a commercial and administrative center large enough by the 1920fs to become a municipality. Trading pros pects attracted a great variety of immigrants, including cleavages consistent with the ethnic divisions have begun to break down as a result of urbanization and increasing educa tional opportunities. The North Tapanuli Batak remain, as a group, the most highly educated, and fill a disproportion ate number of government and plantation offices. They also, with the Chinese, dominate the shops and market stalls of Siantar, although in the last decade they have come under increasing pressure in this sphere from the Simalungun Batak. The South Tapanuli Batak are mostly traders, teachers in Is lamic schools, or government officials, particularly in the small towns ringing the plantations.
The Javanese for the most part remain on the plantations as workers, although many of them have moved to Siantar and found employment as servants or unskilled laborers. Finally, the Simalungun Batak, while numerically the largest group in the regency, have only a very thin layer of educated, urbanized individ uals ; most of these are employed as ministers in the Simalungun church, school teachers, government officials and merchants. Before the arrival of the Dutch toward the close of the nineteenth century, political leadership in Simalungun was monopolized by a traditional aristocracy.6 Although compe tition for power between and within the kingdoms of Simalungun was apparently common in the pre-colonial period, it was ex clusively a game of the aristocracy.
Invested with supernaturally-sanctioned authority (which defined the gap between elite and non-elite), they also dominated the religious and economic lives of their subjects. No alternative leadership groups or institutions existed in the society which might have mounted a challenge to their dominant position. Marga (sibs, exogamous patrilineal descent groups) and lineage seg ments, generally numerically small in any particular locality and/or integrated into the traditional power structure, lacked formal organization and were incapable of opposing the aris tocracy. By the 1930fs, then, the traditional elite had begun to lose its grip on Simalungun society. While still dominant politically, its authority (particularly that of the radja over lesser aristocrats) was heavily dependent on Dutch support and only grudgingly accepted by the new elites which had achieved status in non-traditional spheres of activity. The Japanese occupation contributed further to the differen tiation of elites and the decline of the aristocracy. Higher positions in the plantation and government bureaucracies than had previously been open to them were given to Simalungun Batak (and other Indonesians). At the village level resent ment toward the aristocracy became more widespread, as the rulers participated in the organization of the infamous Japa nese forced labor system. Many villagers left home for the Japanese work gangs and never returned. Finally, military and para-military training combined with nationalist indoc trination greatly enlarged the group of young, partiallyeducated Simalungun Batak willing openly to oppose the con tinuation of traditional political institutions. When the Japanese withdrew, it was this latter group which dealt the death blow to the kingdoms of Simalungun.
Sources on traditional government in
Political loyalties in traditional Simalungun were pri marily territorial rather than based on kinship, and were directed toward the village and keradjaan in which the indi vidual resided and to whose rulers he was subject. The typical Simalungun Batak village contains a variety of marga and sub-marga groups, many of which are unrelated by marriage or descent.
The basic unit of social interaction in the Simalungun village, the sanina, consists of the sons of ego's father or grandsons of his father's father and is not large enough or inclusive enough to provide a basis for village wide social organization.
For assistance in clearing his fields and harvesting and processing his crops, for protec tion against attack by outsiders and against the depredations of evil spirits, the individual in traditional society was dependent on fellow villagers with whom he often had no kin ship ties and on the political leadership of the village and of the more inclusive units of which it was a part.
In the post-colonial period loyalties to village and keradjaan have continued in the form of regional identifica tions. Regionalism has been particularly strong in subdis trict Raja, where the Simalungun language is considered to be purest and whose nineteenth-century Radja Rondahaim is celebrated as an anti-colonial hero, and in subdistrict Purba, once the target of Rondahaim's expansionism. It has become 7 7. Simalungun Batak recognize four Simalungun marga: Saragih, Damanik, Purba and Sinaga. Each of these is further divided into several sub-marga, e. g., Purba Siboro, Saragih Garingging. On the origins of the Simalungun marga, see J. Wismar Saragih, "Silsilah Marga2 di Simalungun," (A Chronicle of the Marga in Simalungun), unpub. paper pre sented to the Seminar on Simalungun Culture, P. Siantar, 1964. increasingly common to find individuals who identify themselves'both by marga and region (e. g. , Johannes Purba-Raja, signifying marga Purba from subdistrict Raja) rather than simply by marga or sub-marga. The division of the Simalungun Protestant Christian Church (GKPS) into three districts (one centered in Raja, one in Purba and the third encompassing the rest of Simalungun and East Sumatra) also reflects the cleavage between the two areas, as does the church's concern to maintain a regional balance in its central leadership. The village head also knows from personal experience that attempts to soften the impact of government instruc tions (e. g . , a reduction in the quantity of rice which his village must supply to the government at a fixed price below the market value) or to make other requests of the subdis trict officer will be mostly unavailing.
Supra
In one case a village in subdistrict Raja had been trying to obtain govern ment assistance in the building of a road for seven years without success.
In this instance the main channel used by the villagers was the official village head-subdistrict officer link, although direct representation to regency and even provincial administrators had also been made. The local military and police representatives, most of whom are not Simalungun Batak and do not live in the subdistrict to which they are posted, are even less useful as channels for the expression of village demands than the subdistrict officer.
Even the village head is often regarded in Upper Sima lungun as the last link in the downward chain of command rather than the first link in an upward chain of represen tation. Although he is popularly elected or-as has been the case when vacancies have occurred in recent years--chosen by the subdistrict officer after consultation with prominent villagers, the consolidation of small villages or hamlets into village complexes for purposes of adminis trative efficiency has meant that to many of his constituents the village head is an outsider.
The village complex of Baringin Raja in subdistrict Raja, for example, consists of five separate hamlets. In the last village election, held in 1953, three candidates, one from each of the three largest hamlets, were nominated for the post of village head. The vote was divided along hamlet lines, with the candidate from the largest hamlet emerging victorious. In 1964, when the author visited Baringin Raja, the village head was held in low esteem, particularly outside his own hamlet.
Considered primarily a tax-and rice-collector and bearer of instructions, he rarely visited the other hamlets under his authority and played no role in their internal affairs. Hamlet disputes were taken to him as a last resort and only after all at tempts at mediation by family members and village elders learned in the adat had failed. According to the villagers, who jealously guarded their traditions of hamlet autonomy, such failures were extremely rare.
The subdistrict and village branches of the Front Nasional, an institution created to provide a channel for the dissemina tion of official propaganda and to enable the government to exercise greater control over the activities of the political parties, have also been ineffective as instruments for the expression of popular demands. In the subdistricts of Upper Simalungun, FN members (appointed by the Regional Head upon recommendations from the subdistrict officer) are mostly un affiliated with the political parties, reside in the subdis trict capital and have little contact with the villages. The seventeen-member FN anak tjabang (sub-branch) in Raja, for example, consisted of the subdistrict officer (as chair man), the army representative, two representatives from the PNI, one representative each from the PKI, Parkindo and Partindo, six non-party school teachers and civil servants, the Protestant minister, two non-party farmers and one Raja businessman.
It met infrequently and then only for the pur pose of receiving instructions from the regency Front Nasional.
In the village the FN ranting (section) membership (appointed by the subdistrict officer on recommendations from the village head) usually contains a selection of vil lage elders, church lay leaders, the local schoolteacher and, where they exist, political party representatives. Its use has been limited to its function as the terminal point for the dissemination of FN pamphlets and newsletters, whose contents are supposed to be passed on orally to the villagers. Most FN ranting members do not bother to read this literature, which they regard as irrelevant to their own and their vil lage's problems.
Without effective political organizations or official governmental channels of communication, contact between the village and the regency government tends to be based on per sonal relationships. The link between the villager who goes to Siantar to make a request on behalf of his village and the government official or other member of the political elite who receives him may be the tie of family, village, region, past association or merely common membership in the ethnic group.
Since the appointment of a Simalungun Batak as Region al Head (see below) the range of officials amenable to such contacts is fairly broad. Although not a party leader or member, the villager may also state his case to a party politician or member of the DPRD-GR who is a Simalungun Batak, or to an official of the church who will relay it to the ap propriate government official. These channels have been em ployed much more commonly in recent years than they had been in the 1950fs but with only limited success. A principal obstacle to the success of this informal and personal kind of representation, as to that of party-related representation, has been the relative powerlessness of the regency government and the lack of resources with which it can meet local demands. Batak.
Since the inauguration of the DPRD-GR, cooperation be tween the "Simalungun bloc" 19 and the Regional Head has been close and, on matters of secondary concern to the party leadership, fairly effective. The bloc obtained informal representation on every committee of the DPRD-GR, enabling its members to keep the Regional Head informed of all com mittee activities designed to undermine his position or oppose his policies. It also lent support in committee and in the full Council to the Regional Headfs annual budget recommendations and backed various projects, such as the acquisition of plantation concessions, as a means of in creasing regency government revenues, and the production of a film on the Revolution in Simalungun, which he proposed.
Despite common ethnicity and the personal obligations of the Simalungun Batak members to the Regional Head, with out whose support they would not have been appointed, the bloc has not been able to unite on important issues, par ticularly with regard to the selection of government person nel. As ethnic differences have constituted the chief nexus of factionalism within the parties,20 so the principal obstacle to ethnic unity in the DPRD-GR has been loyalty to party.
In the most extreme case, the PKIfs Simalungun Batak DPRD-GR member has refused to attend the occasional meetings of the bloc or to cooperate with it in any way. The PNI's Simalungun Batak were more willing to promote bloc activities and even assumed informal positions of leader ship within it. In 1963, however, they overstepped the boundaries of party discipline by signing a letter support ing the candidacy of the Regional Head for the Governorship, for which two of them were suspended and a third expelled from party membership. Since the selection of a Simalungun Batak Regional Head in I960, the urban party leaders have enjoyed a con siderable increase in their influence in regency politics. This influence has been based not on the support of the vil lages , which they have been unable or unwilling to organize effectively, but on the patronage of the Regional Head and his provincial and national allies. In the years 1960-1961 ! -cooperation among the members of the elite, cutting across marga and regional divisions and even to some extent re ligious and traditional-revolutionary cleavages, was possible on many issues. Confronted by a choice between suku and party, however, cooperation could not be maintained. Sima lungun unity, rooted as much in the personal ambitions of the politicians as in their desire to advance the interests of the suku, has proved to be a fragile flower.
The limitations of the
The transition from traditional to colonial to post independence politics has been a difficult one for the Sima lungun Batak community.
Small in numbers, internally diverse, hemmed in by other, larger ethnic groups, the suku and its leadership have been unable to play a significant role in the determination of their own destiny. Their most critical weakness has been their inability to affiliate with a national political party, for it is only through some form of supralocal coalition, on a multi-ethnic basis, that the group can hope to enter the mainstream of Indonesian political life. The representation of some group interests through the provincial army hierarchy and through the army officer who serves as Regional Head has provided a partial substitute for affiliation with a national party, particularly in recent years when the role of the military in authoritative decision making has been much greater than that of the parties. This kind of representation does not, however, provide a stable basis for representation in the political process. army officers, by the nature of their profession, are normally far removed from their cultural origins and respond more readily to stimuli coming from within the military than to demands emanating from their ethnic group. Their relative strength as members of particular internal army factions is derived not from any links with those outside the army whose interests they may from time to time articulate, but rather from factors internal to the army itself (e. g. , the 1956-57 coup, which ended in the strengthening of Karo Batak and secondarily Simalungun Batak, at the expense of North Tapanuli Batak). To depend entirely on army officers for the repre sentation of one's interests means to be at the mercy of the vagaries of internal army politics.
Suku Simalungun is caught in a dilemma. More than any other group in the regency, the Simalungun Batak villagers of Upper Simalungun have been cut off from the political processes of independent Indonesia, The only kind of organization which has been able to win their support has been based on ethnic exclusiveness, a principle which is unacceptable to the domin ant political elite and dysfunctional for the achievement of the groupfs individual and collective goals. Conversely, those few Simalungun Batak politicians, most of them residents of Siantar, who associated themselves with national political par ties have been unable to build support among their potential constituencies in the villages. The Simalungun people and their leadership have thus not been able to develop the kind of polit ical organization, rooted in the villages and linked with the national political system, which might enable them over time to achieve effective representation and a measure of integration into the national political process. Moreover, with continued army dominance of Indonesian political life, the prospects for the development of effective and influential political organi zation do not seem bright.
